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Real Effects of Public Country-by-Country Reporting  
and the Firm Structure of European Banks  
 
 
 
Abstract: 
European regulation mandates public country-by-country reporting for banks and is expected to increase 
costs of tax haven activities. We hand-collect data from IFRS consolidation scopes for European banks 
and test whether the availability of additional public information on banks' global activity reduces their 
tax haven presence. In a difference-in-difference analysis, we find that indeed tax haven presence has 
declined significantly after the introduction of mandatory public country-by-country reporting for 
European banks, as compared to the insurance industry, which is not subject to this regulation. In further 
tests, we show that this negative association is particularly driven by a reduction of subsidiaries in “Dot-
Havens” and tax havens with high financial secrecy. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent multinational banks adjust their presence in the 
form of subsidiaries in tax haven countries in the aftermath of the implementation of extended 
mandatory tax disclosure. We analyze the real effects of public Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) 
as a newly introduced tax disclosure on the organizational structure of the disclosing banks, as such 
disclosure may incur tax, regulatory, and reputational costs. We follow Leuz and Wysocki (2016) by 
investigating a situation in which disclosing firms change their behavior upon disclosure in the real 
economy. 
CbCR has been introduced in response to the on-going public debate about aggressive tax 
planning of multinational enterprises (MNE). CbCR, both private vis-à-vis tax authorities, and public, 
is deemed to allow additional insights into MNE´s tax behavior. CbCR represents a per-country 
breakdown of key financial information about MNE’s global activities. In this vein, mandatory public 
CbCR, as the most comprehensive form of CbCR, was introduced for financial institutions with 
activities in the European Union (EU) in 2014. Based on an initiative by a group of EU parliamentarians 
to increase tax fairness and transparency in the financial sector (Dutt et al. 2019a), Article 89 was added 
to the Credit Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV). Under this directive, regulated financial institutions 
such as banks and investment funds are required to inform the public on activities of their subsidiaries 
and branches at the country level, including sales, employees etc. and also taxes on profit or loss. 
We use this regulatory change and hand-collect data on European banks` subsidiaries to 
study potential behavioral responses of affected banks. We are interested in whether and how the deemed 
incremental tax transparency affects the subsidiary location of banks by means of a subsidiary in low 
tax countries. This question is interesting as it is not upfront clear whether CbCR really is an effective 
tool to trigger behavioral adjustments in multinational banks, i.e. responses in their organizational 
structure. As information on the location of subsidiaries of banks was available to financial statement 
users already before the introduction of public CbCR, from segment reporting and, more detailed, from 
the list of IFRS consolidated entities, the incremental informational value of public CbCR is doubted.  
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However, given that banks are under specific public scrutiny (both by institutional 
monitoring bodies and by the broader public), and are exposed to a negative perception of their activities 
after the financial crisis, users of CbCR might be very sensitive to information about the location of 
subsidiaries. Aggregating and extending locational information at country level might channel 
awareness in a yet unknown pronounced way to the location of subsidiaries even though the underlying 
information had been accessible before. We expect this reputational effect and further costs 
considerations to be dominant. We assume that large banks, who are in the spotlight of authorities and 
the public, anticipate special user sensitivity and respond at short notice in adjusting their tax haven 
subsidiaries’ presence, to reduce costs.  
Costs may result from three different sources. First, reputational costs from public scrutiny 
relating to taxation include negative market reactions to news on using tax havens (Hanlon and Slemrod, 
2009; Dyreng et al., 2016) or a lower engagement in (profitable) tax planning strategies (Graham et al., 
2014; Austin and Wilson, 2017). According to the survey in Graham et al. (2014), corporate tax 
executives rank reputational concerns as the second most important reason to refrain from engaging in 
tax planning activities. Moreover, two recent studies provide experimental evidence about adverse 
consumer reactions after they were exposed to news about tax aggressive firms (Hardeck et al., 2018; 
Asay et al., 2018). Second, tax costs from tax administration scrutiny (expected higher tax payments) 
may arise from more tax risk-focused and additional tax audits prompted by information provided by 
CbCR. In a US setting, Hoopes et al. (2012) provide evidence that firms have higher effective tax rates 
(ETRs) when the Internal Revenue Service imposes higher monitoring. De Simone, Sansing, and 
Seidelman (2013) show that firms` compliance behavior may depend on the tax authority´s effectiveness 
in detecting uncertain tax positions, in which CbCR may be helpful. Third, given that tax havens are 
often also regulatory havens, and frequently provide strong bank secrecy, CbCR may incur additional 
regulatory costs. The supervising authority (European Central Bank, assisted by domestic bank 
supervision) may increase their scrutiny of haven activity, for instance for know-your-customer- and 
anti-money-laundering-requirements in bank-secrecy-states. These anticipated costs, i.e., reputational, 
tax, and regulatory, may thus offset the benefits of a lower overall tax liability on profits from business 
in tax havens. 
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Recent literature shows that public pressure can indeed have effects on MNE’s tax 
behavior. Dyreng et al. (2016) show that NGO-campaigning of ActionAid pressured non-compliant UK 
firms to become compliant with specific transparency requirements. Also, these previously non-
compliant firms subsequently decrease the proportion of their subsidiaries located in low tax countries 
relative to compliant firms. Prior research also shows that incremental disclosure, i.e. the presentation 
of already available information in a more convenient way for information users, may have real effects. 
Christensen et al. (2017) argue that the mandatory inclusion of safety disclosures in US mining firms’ 
financial reports leads to less accidents in mines, even though this information was already publicly 
available in the internet before it mandatory inclusion in financial statements. Again, the authors 
attribute the observed effect to the increased public awareness that lead to a specific firm reaction, in 
this case to higher investments into mine safety. Although the research settings of the aforementioned 
studies differ from our study, their results indicate that also public CbCR may lead to real consequences 
for firms that are part of our analysis.  
We contribute to the extant research in at least three ways. First, by investigating the 
association between tax transparency and the firm structure of multinational banks, we add to the under-
researched area of the taxation of financial firms (Hanlon and Heitzmann, 2010). Second, we provide 
evidence on the real effects of financial disclosure (Leuz and Wysocki 2016) and specifically on the 
global firm structure of MNEs (Kanodia and Sapra, 2016). In this sense, we respond to Dyreng and 
Maydew (2018) who call for more research on how disclosure of tax information affects real behavior. 
Third, we contribute to the strand of literature and on-going discussion about the tax disclosure by CbC-
reports of firms (European Parliament and the Council, 2017; Brown, 2018; De Simone and Olbert, 
2019; Joshi et al., 2019; Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Dutt et al., 2019a, 2019b,).  
While Dyreng et al. (2016) focus on a UK setting and compare the effect of a public 
shaming campaign on non-compliant companies we focus on European banks that become subject to 
mandatory public CbCR in 2014 in EU countries. In contrast to Dyreng et al. (2016) the banks in our 
sample were neither blamed to be non-compliant nor explicitly targeted by a public shaming campaign 
and thus do not suffer from prior reputation costs due to a firm-specific public pressure. Moreover, to 
the best of our knowledge, at no point in our observation period, is there an indication that banks in our 
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sample do not meet their mandatory disclosure requirements. The banks in the sample can be assumed 
to be compliant and fulfilling all their reporting obligations. However, we expect the banks to anticipate 
future potential reputation costs from their tax haven activities under public CbCR and thus adjust their 
organizational structure. In a study on the consequences of private CbCR, De Simone and Olbert (2019) 
report a decrease of subsidiary presence in tax havens for firms that are obliged to share their CbC-
reports with tax authorities but not with the public. We complement this study by generally confirming 
their result of diminishing subsidiaries in tax havens for the largest EU banks. We study the magnitude 
of these organizational adjustments and additionally highlight the role of reputational and regulatory 
costs in the financial sector as banks are exposed to a particularly high risk of public shaming and face 
stricter reporting regulations than other industries. We also draw on a study by Christensen et al. (2017) 
who provide evidence that incremental disclosure can have real effects. In their case, disclosure of safety 
issues increased observable safety in the disclosing firms. In comparison to Christensen et al. (2017) we 
go beyond analyzing the direct effect of mandatory disclosure of tax-related information on tax planning 
behavior, as intended by the regulator, but examine how tax information disclosure is associated with 
spill-overs to fundamental organizational decisions.  
While previous studies analyze the association between public CbCR and tax avoidance 
behavior (Overesch and Wolff, 2019; Joshi et al., 2019; Brown, 2018), we are interested in whether and 
how the deemed incremental tax transparency affects the subsidiary location of banks by means of a 
subsidiary in low tax countries. Overall, it is ex-ante unclear whether the incremental information 
provided by public CbCR is actually relevant to and will be used by investors and the public. On the 
one hand, public CbCR enables its readers to build value ratios about banks’ activity on a per-country 
basis. For instance, unusually high profits in low tax countries relative to only a small number of 
employees may indicate tax avoidance3 and trigger stakeholder responses. On the other hand, an 
important part of the information on firms’ global presence in tax havens was already available prior to 
the introduction of public CbCR. According to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), the 
                                                     
3 According to its 2014 CbCR, Barclays Plc generated an after-tax profit of € 590 million in Luxembourg, a tax 
haven country, with only 30 full-time employees (FTE). This corresponds to an after-tax profit of almost € 20 
million per FTE in Luxembourg. 
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accounting standard of most firms of our study4, companies are required to list subsidiaries including 
their location in their financial reports. Consequently, interested stakeholders were, at least partly, 
already able to infer on the magnitude of tax haven usage by simply analyzing the global distribution of 
banks’ subsidiaries. Hence, it is possible that the incremental information provided by public CbCR is 
only, if at all, of little extra value for investors and might not trigger stakeholder responses (for the 
limited information value of CbCR for the evaluation of a firm’s tax avoidance behavior see Bornemann 
and Eberhartinger, 2017). Dutt et al. (2019b) mitigate some of these concerns. They comprehensively 
analyze whether public CbC reports from EU banks reveal profit shifting and conclude that public CbCR 
indeed increases transparency with respect to worldwide profits and real activities and is also indicative 
of a more distinct tax sensitivity compared to estimations based on conventional databases. However, 
their study does not provide indication for CbCR increasing transparency about tax haven subsidiaries. 
To summarize, none of these studies specifically examine the association of public CbCR for European 
banks’ and their group structure by using a difference-in-difference research design. 
We hand-collect the number of banks’ global subsidiaries and distinguish between tax 
havens and non-tax havens, before and after the public CbCR requirement came into force. As a control 
group, in line with prior literature, we choose large European insurance companies and their global 
subsidiaries. We collect the information on subsidiaries’ countries of residence from the list of 
shareholdings according to consolidated group statements. We differentiate between fully consolidated, 
at-equity consolidated and non-consolidated entities.   
Our findings support the view that increased tax transparency is associated with a reduction 
of tax haven presence. On average, multinational banks under the scope of CRD IV reduce their total 
share of tax haven entities by -2.38 percentage points relative to our control group. Additional model 
specifications indicate an economically meaningful reduction of banks’ subsidiaries in tax havens of 
more than 28% relative to insurance firms after the introduction of public CbCR. When splitting the tax 
haven countries into small tax havens, mostly islands countries with a small population, so called “Dot-
                                                     
4 A small number of firms of our control sample prepare their financial statements according to German GAAP. 
However, the preparation of the consolidation scope under German GAAP is similar to IFRS. 
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Havens” (e.g., Caymans Islands), and other tax havens with a larger population, so called “Big 7 
Havens” (e.g., Singapore), we can observe a significantly negative association between tax transparency 
and tax haven presence in Dot-Havens only. Further tests indicate that tax haven presence is particularly 
reduced in tax haven countries that are also characterized by a relatively high degree of financial secrecy. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
institutional accounting background and details about mandatory tax transparency under European law 
and review prior literature. In Section 3 we develop our hypothesis.. The data and our empirical model 
are described in Section 4 and 5 and we discuss our results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LITERATURE 
2.1 Tax Transparency under CRD IV 
In response to the financial crisis and to the Basel III requirements, and with the general aim of restoring 
public trust in and resilience of the financial sector (European Commission, 2013), the EU implemented 
the Capital Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV). This regulatory package includes an enhanced 
transparency initiative regarding the international activities of banks and other financial firms via 
mandatory public CbCR. Financial institutions have been required to publish key financial information 
about the geographical distribution of their business activities, tax payments and other details since the 
reporting year of 2014. The largest banks were urged to confidentially report parts of this information 
already for the reporting year of 2013 to the European Commission. Public CbCR represents an 
additional disclosure requirement, which is seen as an unanticipated shock for multinational financial 
institutions with operations in the EU (Joshi et al., 2019). This is because the disclosure of formerly 
private and potentially delicate financial and tax information became mandatory as a surprise event at 
the end of the EU legislation process on CRD IV (Dutt et al., 2019a).  According to Article 89 of CRD 
IV, banks have to “disclose annually, specifying by Member State and by third country in which it has 
an establishment, the following information on a consolidated basis for the financial year: name(s), 
nature of activities and geographical location; turnover; number of employees on a full-time equivalent 
basis; profit or loss before tax; tax on profit or loss; public subsidies received. 
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In Article 89 of CRD IV, “establishment” includes subsidiaries, branches, and other 
relevant entities through which a bank has a subsidiary presence in a particular country (European 
Banking Authority, 2014). “Consolidated basis” refers either to the prudential scope of consolidation as 
defined by the CRR representing a less comprehensive consolidation or to the consolidation scope under 
accounting rules. However, the competent authorities of countries where the majority of the banks in 
our sample are headquartered (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) refer to the accounting scope 
of consolidation (Dutt et al., 2019b). 
Public CbCR generally applies to banks as defined in the regulation, which includes banks 
headquartered in the EU with their entities located in- and outside of the EU, and EU-entities of 
institutions headquartered outside of the EU. Consequently, banks operating in the EU but not 
headquartered in any Member State typically have lower publication requirements compared to their 
peers with headquarters in the EU. For banks, Article 89 of CRD IV therefore brought additional 
transparency from 2014 onwards, as compared to merely disclosing consolidated entities, with regard 
to detail, as listed above, with regard to the entities included, not only subsidiaries, but also branches 
and “other relevant entities”, and with regard to aggregation, on a per-country-level.  
 
2.2 The IFRS consolidation scope  
As of 2005, listed corporations with their registered office in the EU are required to prepare their 
consolidated financial statements according to IFRS.5 Disclosure of consolidated entities on a firm-by-
firm basis (i.e. not country-by-country) is required. The IASB has revised its rules regarding the scope 
of consolidation in 2011. IFRS 10 determines the consolidation requirement6, IFRS 11 contains 
provisions on joint arrangements7, and IFRS 12 provides for disclosure in the notes8. Under IFRS, 
                                                     
5 Article 4 Regulation (EC) 606/2002. 
6 IFRS 10 “Consolidated Financial Statements” replaces the relevant rules in IAS 27 and SIC 12 and applies in the 
EU for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2014; Article 2 Regulation (EU) 1254/2012. 
7 IFRS 11 replaces IAS 31 and its interpretation SIC 13. 
8 IFRS 12 addresses the disclosure requirements for entities that have an interest in a subsidiary, a joint 
arrangement, an associate or an unconsolidated structured entity and replaces former disclosure rules required by 
IAS 27 “Consolidated Financial Statements”, IAS 31 “Interest in Joint Ventures” and IAS 28 “Investment in 
Associates”; Deloitte, 2017. 
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normally an entity is fully consolidated if it is controlled by the parent entity. This is usually the case if 
the parent directly or indirectly owns more than half of the voting rights of the entity. Associated entities 
represent parts of a corporate group over which the parent has significant influence and which are 
consolidated by using the equity method. Significant influence normally means that the parent owns 
between 20% and 50%. Hence, also jointly controlled entities fall under this group.  
However, IFRS 10 includes an important difference to the previous rules of IAS 27 and 
SIC 12. The new standard introduces a single consolidation model and also establishes a uniform 
criterion of control applicable to all entities, including structured entities. Irrespective, several studies in 
the literature find that IFRS 10 does not lead to significant changes in the scope of consolidation (e.g.,  
EFRAG, 2012; Jungius, Knappstein and Schmidt, 2015). We follow these prior findings and therefore 
assume comparability of the information contained in all consolidation scopes as well as their 
comprehensiveness over the whole observation period.  
 
2.3 Prior Literature  
Several studies in prior literature investigate the consequences of tax transparency on firm behavior, and 
their findings are inconclusive. Overesch and Wolff (2019), Joshi et al. (2019) and Brown (2018) all 
analyze the effect of CRD IV on the tax avoidance behavior of multinational EU banks, operationalized 
by ETR measures. While the first study reports significantly higher ETRs of multinational banks in the 
post-CbCR periods compared to their domestic peers, Joshi et al. (2019) do not find a robust increase of 
ETRs using, among other, insurance firms as a control group. Contrary to the findings in these studies, 
Brown (2018) shows decreasing ETRs for EU banks relative to EU insurers. ETR changes may be due 
to many different effects, and we focus on tax haven presence as one specific channel of tax aggressive 
strategies. In this respect, our main research question differs from prior studies, and teases out whether 
higher levels of tax transparency have spillovers to fundamental organizational decisions, i.e. banks’ 
global firm structure (real effects). We emphasize that a reduction of tax haven presence and a reduction 
of ETRs are not necessarily connected. A multinational bank may decide to close tax haven entities, and 
still use (different) tax planning strategies. A multinational bank may also decide to maintain their tax 
haven presence, but not use it for tax planning purposes, i.e. not shift profits to the tax haven entity.  
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Bouvatier et al. (2018) provide a study using a comprehensive database of public CbCR for 
the 36 largest European banks. By applying a standard gravity model to identify abnormal amounts of 
financial transactions, their findings suggest that banks’ activity in tax havens is three times larger than 
the model’s predictions on average. Moreover, German and British banks seem to display the most 
aggressive tax strategies, and the Channel Islands, Luxembourg and Monaco serve as the most 
prominent European tax havens. Concerning the commercial presence of banks in tax havens, the 
authors do not find a significant change in average turnover figures in tax havens, in the CbC-reports 
for the years 2015 and 2016. However, as public CbCR was already in place for both years of their 
analysis, it is not possible to draw conclusions on how the introduction of CbCR affects tax haven 
presence. By contrast, we use the number of subsidiaries of multinational banks as a proxy for the 
commercial presence in tax havens. This information is available before and after public CbCR was 
introduced and allows us to observe adaptive behavior. 
In a related research setting, Johannesen and Larsen (2016) conduct an event study around 
the days when public CbCR rules for European firms from the extractive industry were adopted and 
report significant negative abnormal returns for affected firms. The authors explain these findings by 
two possible channels, the disclosed information (1) may help authorities to detect tax evasion and (2) 
may increase public pressure for firms that report low effective tax rates. Hence, investors perceive 
CbCR for the extractive industry negatively, because CbCR is seen as a tool to curb aggressive tax 
planning opportunities, and reducing firm’s expected future (net) earnings.  It is possible that bank 
managers view these findings as a signal for future reputational costs connected to similar disclosure 
regulations in the financial sector and make real changes to their firm decisions. Importantly, our study 
differs from Johannesen and Larsen (2016) as we are concerned about the effects of public CbCR on the 
group structure of multinational banks, and we focus on changes in the number of subsidiaries rather 
than in abnormal returns. In a related event study, Dutt et al. (2019a) do not find a significant stock 
market reaction around the announcement dates of public CbCR in the financial sector.  
Dyreng et al. (2016) analyze the effect of a public shaming NGO campaign against FTSE 
100 firms that used to be non-compliant with a specific transparency law requiring UK firms to disclose 
a complete list of their subsidiaries including the geographical location. The authors report that the NGO 
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campaign not only urged non-compliant companies to comply with the law but further made them 
decrease the proportion of their subsidiaries located in low tax countries relative to compliant firms. 
Their analysis of non-compliant firms differs from our study as we are concerned about the effects of 
incremental mandatory tax transparency on compliant firms in the financial sector. Furthermore, our 
theoretical channel relies on anticipated future reputational costs, increased scrutiny by tax 
administration and regulatory supervision instead of actual reputational costs as a result of an NGO 
campaign.  
In a non-tax related study, Christensen et al. (2017) provide evidence that incremental 
financial statement information may lead to real effects: compulsory inclusion of information on safety 
violations in the financial statements of US mining companies led to fewer accidents in mines, although 
this information has been previously disclosed in the Internet before being included in the financial 
reports. Moreover, the observed effect leading to real effects in the form of higher investments in mine 
safety is attributed to ex-ante concerns of mine managers about political and reputational costs as well 
as concerns about activism by investors or other parties. Apart from the obvious fact that our study 
addresses a very different research setting, we argue that the information about banks’ presence in tax 
havens was, in principle, also available in financial reports before public CbCR was available. 
Consistent with Christensen et al., however, it is possible that the dissemination of incremental tax 
transparency by CRD IV triggers changes in the firm structure of affected banks because the form of the 
disclosure may facilitate the analysis of firms’ global economic footprint. 
In one of the few existing studies on profit-shifting in the financial sector, Langenmayr and 
Reiter (2017) identify an important and bank-specific profit-shifting channel. They find that banks 
strategically relocate their proprietary trading units to low-tax countries. Proprietary trading is a highly 
mobile and profitable business activity that reacts particularly sensitive to a change in the corporate 
income tax rate. Consequently, they find a tax semi-elasticity of -4.0 for fixed-income trading assets, 
which largely exceeds other estimates in prior literature. In contrast to our analysis, Langenmayr and 
Reiter (2017) abstract from specific disclosure regulation but rather cater to the importance of tax 
avoidance in the financial industry. According for their finding and further for potential reputational 
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concerns from disclosed tax haven usage, we expect multinational banks to react very sensitive to the 
disclosure of tax haven activities in face of public CbCR. 
To the best of our knowledge, no prior study addresses the consequences of public CbCR 
on the firm structure of European banks by using data of banks’ subsidiaries from consolidation scopes 
that are available before and after the introduction of CRD IV. Our research question is of interest as in 
face of enormous regulatory requirements for banks, CbCR is expected to provide only very limited 
additional information to stakeholders in this industry. 
3 Hypothesis  
On a general level, our main research question is whether and to what extent incremental information, 
which is potentially costly, affects firm´s organizational choices. More precisely, we investigate whether 
multinational banks reduce their tax haven presence, i.e. their number of subsidiaries, after the 
introduction of public CbCR. 
Stakeholders such as activist groups (e.g., Oxfam, 2017) or the public press (e.g., The 
Independent, 2015) blame banks of shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Also, the literature provides 
some evidence about tax avoidance behavior of the financial sector, e.g., Langenmayr and Reiter (2017), 
and Merz and Overesch (2016). However, little is known about the subsidiaries of banks in tax havens 
in general and the effects of attempts to curb banks’ profit shifting by increasing tax transparency.  
Public CbCR may or may not affect the number of tax haven subsidiaries. On the one hand, 
it is likely that public CbCR negatively influences tax haven presence. While before as well as after the 
introduction of public CbCR, stakeholders can inform themselves on tax haven presence from the IFRS 
list of consolidated entities, public CbCR not only adds to the salience of such information, but also 
contains more details. Stakeholders may be better able to distinguish between activities that fulfill core 
business functions and activities with the possible purpose of tax avoidance. Tax aggressive 
multinational banks can be identified more easily as “poor corporate citizens” by customers, media, and 
policy makers, resulting in reputational costs (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). Reputational concerns have 
been aggravated by the financial crisis from 2008, and by the use of taxpayer´s money for bail-out. In 
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face of this increased sensitivity towards reputational issues and to avoid further reputational damage, 
banks may withdraw from tax havens. Such responses to reputational concerns are consistent with the 
institutional theory, assuming that firms will conform to institutional expectations (“reduce profit 
shifting”), formed by, e.g., policy makers or the media, by adopting institutional norms (Gramlich and 
Whiteaker-Poe, 2013). It is possible that mandatory tax-related disclosures reinforce such adoption and 
may in turn lead to a reduction of banks’ tax haven exposure. Moreover, public CbCR may reduce tax 
aggressiveness as it gives tax authorities roadmaps for tax audits, i.e. orientation on which financial 
institution and tax issue to challenge in their auditing processes.  
Other costs may result from increased regulatory scrutiny, which is in line with prior 
literature showing that increased regulatory attention on firm’s tax disclosure has a deterring effect on 
tax aggressiveness. Kubick et al. (2016) document that firms who received a tax related comment letter 
from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have higher ETRs in the years after 
the receipt of a comment letter.  
Furthermore, many tax havens offer provide also strict banking secrecy facilitating the 
obfuscation of economic activity (regulatory-havens). Hence, banks may worry about increased know-
your-customer inquiries or anti-money-laundering laws as a result from as public CbCR (Dutt et al. 
(2019b). Expected regulatory costs may play are particular role for banks with presence in regulatory 
havens.  
On the other hand, public CbCR may not reduce tax haven presence of multinational banks, 
if benefits from tax savings or business models outweigh tax, regulatory, and reputational costs. 
Investors may appreciate compliant tax planning strategies, and are unlikely to change their attitude 
under public CbCR. Furthermore, Evers et al. (2016) question the additional insights and benefits from 
public CbCR for tax authorities. The authors argue that tax authorities and regulatory bodies already 
have access to information about banks’ common tax haven activities, which alleviates the relevance of 
the CbC-information and make organizational adjustment unlikely. 
It is therefore an empirical question whether the introduction of public CbCR has an effect 
on the group structure of multinational banks and their presence in tax havens. We state the following 
hypotheses: 
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H1: Following the introduction of public CbCR, EU banks decrease their tax haven 
presence, relative to EU insurance firms. 
4 Data and sample selection 
We estimate tax haven presence by the share of tax haven entities on the number of total entities of 
multinational financial firms located in the EU, thereby measuring the relative presence in tax havens 
for each firm. We prefer the relative number of tax haven entities to the absolute number, because such, 
we also capture the general trend of reducing the number of entities, which has been observed since the 
financial crisis. As an alternative specification, we also use the absolute number of tax haven entities as 
a dependent variable while controlling for the total number of subsidiaries. This information on 
subsidiaries is usually disclosed in the notes of financial statements prepared according to IFRS. For our 
main sample, we hand-collect data from the list of shareholdings as shown in annual reports of the 
Global Systemically Important Institutions (G-SIIs) headquartered in the EU as defined by the EBA 
(2015) for the years 2011-2015. Of the 37 G-SIIs, we have to drop 6 banks and therefore include 31 
banks in our analysis. Table 1.1 presents the sample selection process for EU banks.9 
 
“Table 1.1 around here” 
 
The data includes the name and type of the entity, the geographical location, the consolidation status 
and other details over time. We differentiate between fully consolidated entities, associated entities 
under the equity method and non-consolidated entities.  
We follow a standard approach of prior literature and use multinational insurance firms 
headquartered in the EU as our control group. EU insurance firms are not subject to tax transparency 
requirements via public CbCR. We acknowledge that insurance firms are different to banks in many 
                                                     
9 In general our data panel is balanced, however a small amount of firm-year observations is missing due to 
unavailability of the data. For instance, the consolidation scopes of HSBC Holdings plc could only be obtained for 
the years 2012 and 2015. Requests for data to e.g. investor relations teams of the relevant firms remained 
unsuccessful.   
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regards. However, in line with prior literature (e.g., Bischof and Daske, 2013; Chircop and Novotny-
Farkas, 2016; Beatty at al., 1996; Overesch and Wolff, 2018), we still find that they form an adequate 
control group for our purposes. First, both types of firms serve as financial intermediaries who do 
business internationally, and who both may be active in tax havens. Second, similar to banks whose 
profits largely depend on interest spread, insurers also depend strongly on the interest rate environment. 
Third, they both compete in markets for similar investment and protection products, i.e. government 
bonds or credit default swaps. Finally, EU banks and EU insurers are subject to supervision, and to 
similar regulatory and prudential rules that pursue a risk-based approach to minimum capital 
requirements and promote the integrated use of models by institutions in risk management and solvency 
assessment (Al-Darwish et al., 2011).10 We hand-collect data on subsidiaries as shown in the notes of 
IFRS statements of multinational insurers, which are insurance groups for supervision by the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority (EIOPA, 2015). The total control sample consists of 27 
EU insurers. Table 1.2 presents the sample selection process. We obtain financial data for our control 
variables from S&P Global Market Intelligence. 
 
“Table 1.2 around here” 
5 Empirical Design 
In order to assess our main research question, we apply a difference-in-difference (DiD) research design 
to isolate the effect of incremental tax transparency on banks’ group structures and their presence in tax 
havens relative to a group of firms not affected by public CbCR. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the 
research question in Libby Boxes.  
 
“Figure 1 around here” 
 
                                                     
10 Other controls groups are not adequate: Large banks headquartered in non-EU countries offer no clear setting, 
because their EU-subsidiaries are subject to public CbCR; small EU banks are not, or not sufficiently active 
internationally. 
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Hence, we choose the share of tax haven entities on the total number of entities as our 
dependent variable (
𝑡𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
). As independent variables we include the time dummy “postCbCR” 
that equals 1 for financial years 2014 and 2015 or 0 otherwise. Moreover, our model contains the dummy 
variable “Bank” that equals 1 for EU headquartered banks or 0 for EU headquartered insurance groups. 
In addition, we control for time-varying bank and insurer characteristics that may be correlated with tax 
haven usage. We control for the logarithm of a firm’s total assets and employees to control for size, the 
return on average assets (ROAA) to control for profitability and the GAAP effective tax rate to keep tax 
planning opportunities constant. The coefficient of interest in our model is therefore 𝛽3 capturing the 
average effect of public CbCR on banks relative to insurers. Given that we carefully hand-collected data 
for our dependent variable and as the sample size is small, we refrain from any outlier treatment in the 
form of e.g. winsorizing or truncating.   
 
(I) 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑏𝐶𝑅𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐶𝑏𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
6 Results 
Public CbCR represents an increase of incremental tax transparency for multinational banks that fall 
under the scope of CRD IV. In this subsection, we present our results based on descriptive statistics and 
DiD-specifications using a treatment and control sample for the years 2011-2015. As public CbCR 
became mandatory in 2014, the pre-treatment years are 2011, 2012 and 2013. Accordingly, 2014 and 
2015 serve as the period when mandatory tax transparency for banks was in effect.  
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 give an overview about the headquarter locations of our banks and 
insurers. Our sample consists of firms headquartered in ten EU countries, with Germany and the United 
Kingdom hosting most banks and insurers. 
 
“Tables 2.1 and 2.2 around here” 
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Figure 2 illustrates the tax haven presence for banks and insurers graphically over time. It 
shows that banks increase their relative tax haven presence (i.e. the share of tax haven subsidiaries) in 
the pre-CbCR period. However, for financial years after 2013 when public CbCR is applied, banks 
reduce their share of tax haven subsidiaries. In contrast, insurance firms increase their share of tax haven 
subsidiaries in every year except 2013. 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics separately for the treatment and control group. On 
average, and not surprisingly, banks are bigger in size and less profitable. Their mean number of total 
entities and entities located in tax haven is greater than the equivalent figures for insurers over the whole 
sample period. Moreover, the mean ratio of banks’ tax haven entities and banks’ total entities (“Share 
Haven”) is 12.7% compared to 8.9% for insurers. Banks have on average also more employees and pay 
fewer taxes measured by the GAAP effective tax rate. 
 
“Table 3 around here” 
 
Table 4 illustrates our regression results. For all columns the dependent variable is the share 
of tax haven entities (
𝑡𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
) based on the respective tax haven list. Our coefficient of interest is 
the interaction term of Bank*PostCbCR, measuring the average treatment effect of public CbCR in the 
years when public CbCR was in place. The result in column (1) suggests that, on average, banks decrease 
their overall share of tax haven entities by 2.38 percentage points relative to insurance firms, which are 
not affected by public CbCR11. Additional tests reveal that this reduction is predominantly centered on 
fully consolidated subsidiaries (untabulated). 
 
“Table 4 around here” 
 
                                                     
11 We include Delaware (U.S) in our list of tax havens because our data collection approach allows the collection 
of information on domestic tax havens as well. However, as Delaware is not part of the original lists in Dyreng 
and Lindsey (2009), we run our regressions again excluding Delaware from the list of tax havens. The non-
tabulated results are qualitatively similar to the results shown in Table 3. 
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Next, we check whether the reduction of tax haven entities depends on the type of tax haven 
country. Appendix A shows our lists of tax havens. Therefore, we differentiate the tax haven countries 
into Dot-Havens and Big 7 Havens following Hines & Rice (1994). Dot-Havens are tax haven countries 
with a population of less than 1 million and usually represent small islands economies. By contrast, Big 
7 Havens are tax haven countries with a population exceeding 1 million. It is likely that in these countries 
economic substance rather than tax or bank secrecy drive firm’s presence. We expect that one channel 
why banks reduce their tax haven presence in response to public CbCR is due to reputational concerns. 
Consequently, we expect that banks who are subject to increased tax transparency reduce their number 
of Dot-Haven entities to a greater extent than entities located elsewhere because an engagement in Dot-
Haven countries may attract particular negative publicity.  
Our results confirm this prediction. Table 4 reports a negative and significant reduction of 
the share of entities that are located in Dot-Havens (column (2)). Applying the same method only for 
Big 7 Havens shows a contrary result. Table 4 column (3) reports a negative but statistically insignificant 
effect on the share of entities located in Big 7 Havens. Additionally we check whether public CbCR is 
also associated with a reduction of entities in EU tax havens.12 Table 4 column (4) shows a negative 
coefficient of the interactions term, which is, however, smaller and less significant compared to columns 
(1) and (2).  
In order to check for robustness and to mitigate concerns about outliers in the data, we alter 
our model of equation (I) into a log-level specification and use the natural logarithm of the absolute 
number of tax haven subsidiaries as the dependent variable. Additionally, we add the natural logarithm 
of the total number of subsidiaries to the right-hand side of the regression to control for a general change 
in the number of subsidiaries. Table 5 shows the results that are generally consistent with the previous 
model specification. The results are also economically meaningful as the coefficient of the interaction 
term in Table 5 indicates a reduction of banks tax haven presence of -28.1%13  after the introduction of 
                                                     
12 Based on the tax haven list of Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), EU tax havens are Cyprus, Gibraltar, Ireland, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Malta. 
13 100·(𝑒−0,330−1)%. 
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public CbCR relative to the control group. This result is again more pronounced for Dot-Havens (-
35.1%). 
 
“Table 5 around here” 
 
Next, we run a placebo test based on firm subsidiary presence in Delaware (U.S.) to present 
further evidence for the role of reputational costs in expectation to increased tax transparency. In public 
CbC reports, Delaware, just like any other U.S. state, is subsumed under the United States line item and 
therefore “hidden”. Because the United States as a whole country are not considered a tax haven, firm 
presence in Delaware should not be subjects to reputational costs in the context of public CbCR 
disclosure. We therefore do not expect a decrease of subsidiaries in Delaware after the introduction of 
public CbCR. The results in table 6 are in line with our expectation. The coefficient of the interaction 
term is negative, however statistically insignificant.  
 
“Table 6 around here” 
 
As mentioned earlier, also regulatory concerns could play a role for managers when 
deciding about their global organizational structure. Prior literature shows that firms invest in tax havens 
not only for tax reasons but also for the secrecy these countries offer (Braun and Weichenrieder, 2015).   
We therefore create a list of tax havens that display high financial secrecy, i.e. a strong banking secrecy 
or the unwillingness to engage in information sharing with other countries. First, we match the countries 
from our tax haven list based on Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) with the Financial Secrecy Index (FSI) of 
the Tax Justice Network (2015). This index ranks countries according to their level of secrecy with 
higher ranks indicating less financial transparency, less engagement in information sharing with other 
national authorities and less compliance with international anti-money-laundering norms.  
In a next step, we create a list of “tax & regulatory havens” that are defined as tax havens 
with an above median rank in the FSI. Accordingly, “tax & non-regulatory havens” are tax havens with 
a below median rank in the FSI. As public CbCR increased financial transparency significantly at the 
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country-level (Dutt et al., 2019b), we expect the decrease of subsidiaries located in opaque tax havens 
(“tax & regulatory havens”) to be stronger compared to relatively transparent tax havens (“tax & non-
regulatory havens”). The results in Table 7 confirm our expectation. We only find a significant negative 
association between public CbCR and banks’ presence in “tax and regulatory havens” in column (1). In 
contrast, column (2) shows no significant result for the same test based on a list of  “non-regulatory” tax 
havens. Accordingly, we expect this negative association to exist also for Dot-Havens that are 
characterized by high financial secrecy but not for Dot-Havens with relatively low financial secrecy. 
We therefore define “Dot & Non-Regulatory Havens” as Dot-Havens with an above median rank in the 
FSI. Column (3) confirms our expectation and reports a negative and statistically significant coefficient 
of the interaction term. However, when running the same test for Dot-Havens with a below median rank 
in the FSI (column (4)), the coefficient does not load.  
 
“Table 7 around here” 
 
As an additional robustness check, we examine whether country-specific financial secrecy 
alone affects subsidiary presence of banks over time without differentiating countries into tax havens. 
Hence, we perform a median-split of the FSI list and run our DiD model for countries above and below 
the median-rank separately. Table 8 reports an insignificant result for countries that display relatively 
high financial secrecy and a positive and statistically significant result for countries with relatively low 
financial secrecy.  
 
“Table 8 around here” 
 
Collectively, these results suggest that regulatory concerns indeed play a role for banks 
when deciding about their corporate group structure in light of increased financial transparency. 
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7 Conclusion  
In this paper, we study the association of public CbCR and subsidiary presence of multinational EU 
banks in tax haven countries. Although the information on the location of subsidiaries of banks was 
publicly available already before, public CbCR increased country-specific transparency at the intensive 
margin. It is therefore possible that its introduction leads to additional costs triggered by the increased 
attention from tax administrations, regulatory bodies and the public. Incremental transparency could be 
costly, especially for banks, as they are subject to a variety of strict regulatory requirements and face a 
higher reputational risks, especially since the financial crisis.  
Our results indicate that multinational EU banks reduce their presence in tax havens after the 
introduction of public CbCR relative to unaffected insurance firms. When differentiating our tax havens 
into Dot-Havens (e.g. Bahamas) and Big 7 Havens (e.g. Singapore), we report a significantly negative 
association only for Dot-Havens. Furthermore, our results suggest that banks particularly close 
subsidiaries in opaque tax havens with high financial secrecy, highlighting regulatory concerns in 
addition to tax matters that were the original intention of the regulation.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we refer to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), 
who call for more research on the taxation of financial institutions. Our study contributes to this stream 
of literature by providing evidence on the consequences of a regulatory attempt to curb tax 
aggressiveness by increasing tax transparency in the financial sector. 
Second, our study contributes to the growing literature of “real” effects of financial transparency 
by shedding light on the impact of a targeted disclosure regulation on the financial industry (Kanodia 
and Sapra, 2016). We investigate whether the introduction of public CbCR has an effect on the group 
structure of multinational banks, especially on their presence in tax havens. We find an association 
between CbCR and bank’ subsidiaries in tax havens even though CbCR in the banking industry provides 
only very little information that has not been available to stakeholders before. 
Finally, our study is of particular relevance for policy makers in the current political debate. 
Since the European Parliament and the Council urge CbCR to become public for all industries (European 
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Parliament and the Council, 2017), results of this paper provide much needed empirical evidence 
contributing to this on-going discussion. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Libby Boxes 
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Figure 2: Tax haven presence of banks and insurers 
 
 
This figure illustrates the development of tax haven presence for banks and insurers over time. We plot the average share of 
tax haven entities (
𝑡𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
)  on an annual basis.  
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Table 1.1: Sample selection EU banks 
Selection criteria Firms 
European Banking Authority (EBA) list of global systemically important banks (G-SIB) as at 2015 37 
 
Firm from Norway not subject to CBCR disclosure rules (DNB) -1 
Firms for which no consolidation scope could be obtained -4 
(ABN Amro, ING, Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena, Nationwide)   
Purely domestic firm according to the consolidation scope (Banque Postale) -1 
Final sample 31 
 
This table presents the sample selection for EU banks. 
 
 
Table 1.2: Sample selection EU insurers 
Selection criteria Firms 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 102 
list of identified insurance groups for Supervision as at 2015 
Firms from EU countries not included in the primary sample of EU banks e.g. Bulgaria or Greece -20 
Firms for which no consolidation scope could be obtained -16 
Firms for which English language financial statements could not be obtained -8 
Firms domiciled in tax havens -2 
Firms part of an EU bank -22 
Bankruptcy or merger during the sample period  -3 
Firms with missing data to calculate control variables -2 
Purely domestic firms according to the consolidation scope -2 
Final sample 27 
 
This table presents the sample selection for EU insurers. 
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Table 2.1 
Composition by Country - EU Banks 
Country Firms % 
Austria 1 3.23% 
Belgium 1 3.23% 
Denmark 1 3.23% 
France 5 16.13% 
Germany 7 22.58% 
Italy 2 6.45% 
Netherlands 1 3.23% 
United Kingdom 5 16.13% 
Spain 4 12.90% 
Sweden 4 12.90% 
Total 31 100.00% 
 
This table shows the composition of headquarter countries of EU banks. 
 
 
  
Table 2.2 
Composition by Country - EU Insurers 
Country Firms % 
Austria 2 7.41% 
Belgium 1 3.70% 
France 4 14.81% 
Germany 9 33.33% 
Italy 3 11.11% 
United Kingdom 6 22.22% 
Spain 2 7.41% 
Total 27 100.00% 
  
This table shows the composition of headquarter countries of EU insurers. 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523909
  
33 
 
 
 
This table presents summary statistics for banks and insurers. Entities is the total number of entities collected from the list of 
shareholdings of banks and insurers, irrespective of their form of (non-)consolidation. Of these, Haven Entities is the number 
of entities located in tax havens based on Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). Share Haven is the number of Haven Entities scaled by 
Entities.TotalAssets is  total assets. ROAA is the return on average assets (total average assets equals total assets at the beginning 
of the period, plus total assets at the end of the period, divided by two). AverageFTE is the average of the number of full-time-
equivalent employees per year. ETR is the GAAP-effective tax rate. 
 
 
 
 
  
Banks n=31
mean sd min max p25 p50 p75
Entities 516 478 23 2 097 168 334 843
Haven Entities 85 144 0 795 7 28 97
Share Haven 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.42 0.06 0.10 0.17
Totalassets 947 000 000 731 000 000 127 000 000 2 810 000 000 358 000 000 737 000 000 1 480 000 000
ROAA 0.18 0.70 -6.83 1.03 0.09 0.26 0.44
AverageFTE 75 183 61 750 6 470 274 496 20 823 54 034 122 000
ETR 24.64 34.79 -206.63 100.26 20.50 26.68 35.85
Insurers n=27
mean sd min max p25 p50 p75
Entities 267 305 9 1 304 61 162 303
Haven Entities 31 45 0 207 2 10 28
Share Haven 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.38 0.05 0.08 0.12
Totalassets 241 000 000 295 000 000 3 795 800 1 040 000 000 26 700 000 79 200 000 428 000 000
ROAA 0.80 0.93 -1.80 4.75 0.34 0.61 1.00
AverageFTE 28 025 35 775 147 149 165 4 723 13 853 35 723
ETR 29.32 25.51 -99.14 131.38 20.95 27.83 36.25
Table 3
Summary Statistics
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Table 4 
Public CbCR and Tax Haven Presence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TaxHavens DotHavens Big7 EUHavens 
          
PostCbCR 0.0150** 0.0126*** 0.00710 0.0151** 
  (0.00662) (0.00387) (0.00564) (0.00697) 
Banks*PostCbCR -0.0238** -0.0235*** -0.00527 -0.0174* 
  (0.0111) (0.00876) (0.00519) (0.0103) 
log_TotalAssets -0.0261 -0.0110 -0.0105 -0.0213 
  (0.0295) (0.0241) (0.0124) (0.0207) 
ROAA -7.03e-05 -0.00127 -0.00123 -0.00167 
  (0.00575) (0.00459) (0.00249) (0.00405) 
logFTE -0.0521 -0.0788** 0.0728** -0.0434 
  (0.0316) (0.0311) (0.0323) (0.0281) 
ETR -0.000125 -9.76e-05 -4.18e-05 -6.58e-05 
  (0.000103) (7.53e-05) (3.04e-05) (4.18e-05) 
Constant 1.142* 1.070* -0.490 0.903* 
  (0.647) (0.560) (0.305) (0.520) 
          
Observations 234 234 234 234 
R-squared 0.053 0.086 0.094 0.055 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Cluster firm firm firm firm 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
This table presents regression results on the effects of public CbCR on the firm structure of multinational banks 
by comparing their tax haven presence in the period 2011-2015 with insurance firms. Banks is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for banks and equal to 0 for insurers. PostCbCR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for financial years 
2014 and 2015 and equal to 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the number of tax haven entities scaled by the 
total number of entities (
𝑡𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
). Results in column (1) are based on the tax haven list in Dyreng and 
Lindsey (2009), in column (2) based on “Dot-Tax Havens” (Hines and Rice, 1994), in column (3) based on “Big7-
Tax Havens” (Hines and Rice, 1994) and column (4) based on EU members part of the tax haven list in Dyreng 
and Lindsey (2009). Log_TotalAssets is the natural log of total assets. ROAA is the return on average assets (total 
average assets equals total assets at the beginning of the period, plus total assets at the end of the period, divided 
by two). Log_FTE is the natural log of the number of full-time-equivalent employees. ETR is the GAAP-effective 
tax rate. 
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Table 5 
Public CbCR and Tax Haven Presence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES TaxHavens DotHavens Big7 EUHavens 
          
PostCbCR 0.202*** 0.267*** 0.101 0.307*** 
  (0.0681) (0.0844) (0.0792) (0.109) 
Banks*PostCbCR -0.330** -0.432*** -0.147 -0.365** 
  (0.125) (0.154) (0.117) (0.162) 
logsubnum 1.024*** 1.146*** 1.099*** 1.110*** 
  (0.113) (0.149) (0.160) (0.192) 
log_TotalAssets -0.335 -0.279 -0.424 -0.215 
  (0.352) (0.416) (0.386) (0.317) 
ROAA -0.135 -0.0324 -0.0463 -0.133 
  (0.127) (0.132) (0.0979) (0.108) 
logFTE -1.065** -1.476*** 1.136* -1.288** 
  (0.415) (0.520) (0.604) (0.554) 
ETR -0.00212 -0.00224 -0.00253 0.000188 
  (0.00232) (0.00325) (0.00219) (0.000870) 
Constant 14.88* 16.87* -7.260 13.72 
  (7.754) (9.579) (9.786) (9.227) 
          
Observations 225 214 194 209 
R-squared 0.403 0.411 0.440 0.466 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Cluster firm firm firm firm 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
This table presents regression results on the effects of public CbCR on the firm structure of multinational banks 
by comparing their tax haven presence in the period 2011-2015 with insurance firms. Banks is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 for banks and equal to 0 for insurers. PostCbCR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for financial years 
2014 and 2015 and equal to 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the natural log of the number of tax haven 
entities. Results in column (1) are based on the tax haven list in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), in column (2) based 
on “Dot-Tax Havens” (Hines and Rice, 1994), in column (3) based on “Big7-Tax Havens” (Hines and Rice, 1994) 
and column (4) based on EU members part of the tax haven list in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). Logsubnum is the 
natural log of the total numbers of entities. Log_TotalAssets is the natural log of total assets. ROAA is the return 
on average assets (total average assets equals total assets at the beginning of the period, plus total assets at the end 
of the period, divided by two). Log_FTE is the natural log of the number of full-time-equivalent employees. ETR 
is the GAAP-effective tax rate. 
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Table 6 
Public CbCR and Delaware 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Delaware 
    
PostCbCR 0.0012 
  (0.00102) 
Banks*PostCbCR -0.00354 
  (0.0023) 
log_TotalAssets -0.0001 
  (0.00773) 
ROAA -0.00141 
  (0.00144) 
logFTE -0.0138 
  (0.00961) 
ETR -0.00004 
  (0.000037) 
Constant 0.157 
  (0.124) 
    
Observations 234 
R-squared 0.025 
Firm-fixed effects yes 
Cluster firm 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table presents regression results on the effects of public CbCR on the firm structure of multinational banks by comparing 
their presence in Delaware (U.S.) in the period 2011-2015 with insurance firms. Banks is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 
banks and equal to 0 for insurers. PostCbCR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for financial years 2014 and 2015 and equal to 
0 otherwise. 
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Table 7 
Public CbCR and tax and regulatory havens 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tax & 
RegHavens 
Tax & 
NonRegHavens 
Dot & 
RegHavens 
Dot & 
NonRegHavens 
          
PostCbCR 0.0138** 2.91e-05 0.00947** -0.000122 
  (0.00647) (0.000595) (0.00359) (0.000363) 
Banks*PostCbCR -0.0242** 0.00399 -0.0178** -0.000402 
  (0.0104) (0.00456) (0.00813) (0.000397) 
log_TotalAssets -0.0216 -0.00396 -0.00939 -0.00276 
  (0.0267) (0.00412) (0.0224) (0.00292) 
ROAA 0.00168 -0.000483 -0.000988 0.000598 
  (0.00542) (0.00126) (0.00416) (0.000461) 
logFTE -0.0421 0.00360 -0.0766** -0.00128 
  (0.0295) (0.00626) (0.0294) (0.00311) 
ETR -8.25e-05 -2.28e-06 -5.59e-05 4.39e-06 
  (7.32e-05) (1.40e-05) (5.71e-05) (3.17e-06) 
Constant 0.936 0.0448 1.012* 0.0676 
  (0.613) (0.0759) (0.522) (0.0407) 
          
Observations 234 234 234 234 
R-squared 0.050 0.044 0.074 0.039 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
Cluster firm firm firm firm 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
 
This table presents regression results on the effects of public CbCR on the firm structure of multinational banks by comparing 
their tax haven presence in the period 2011-2015 with insurance firms.  Banks is an indicator variable equal to 1 for banks and 
equal to 0 for insurers. PostCbCR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for financial years 2014 and 2015 and equal to 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable is the number of tax haven entities scaled by the total number of entities (
𝑡𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
). Results in 
column (1) are based on tax haven countries in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) having an above median rank in the Financial 
Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network, 2015). Results in column (2) are based on tax haven countries in Dyreng and Lindsey 
(2009) having a below median rank in the Financial Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network, 2015). Results in column (3) are 
based on Dot-Haven countries having an above median rank in the Financial Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network, 2015). 
Results in column (4) are based on Dot-Haven countries having an below median rank in the Financial Secrecy Index (Tax 
Justice Network, 2015). Log_TotalAssets is the natural log of total assets. ROAA is the return on average assets (total average 
assets equals total assets at the beginning of the period, plus total assets at the end of the period, divided by two). Log_FTE is 
the natural log of the number of full-time-equivalent employees. ETR is the GAAP-effective tax rate. 
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Table 8 
Public CbCR and presence in countries with high/low financial secrecy 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES High Financial Secrecy Low Financial Secrecy 
      
PostCbCR 0.00455 -0.00786** 
  (0.00421) (0.00377) 
Banks*PostCbCR -0.00744 0.0209* 
  (0.0126) (0.0111) 
log_TotalAssets -0.0448 0.0216 
  (0.0378) (0.0324) 
ROAA 0.00999 -0.0112 
  (0.0104) (0.0102) 
logFTE -0.0214 0.0489 
  (0.0408) (0.0435) 
ETR -5.75e-05 -0.000149** 
  (0.000107) (7.22e-05) 
Constant 1.742* -0.637 
  (0.893) (0.730) 
      
Observations 234 234 
R-squared 0.039 0.051 
Firm-fixed effects yes yes 
Cluster firm firm 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
This table presents regression results on the effects of public CbCR on the firm structure of multinational banks by comparing 
their presence in countries with high/low financial secrecy in the period 2011-2015 with insurance firms.  Banks is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 for banks and equal to 0 for insurers. PostCbCR is an indicator variable equal to 1 for financial years 2014 
and 2015 and equal to 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is the number of tax haven entities scaled by the total number of 
entities (
𝑡𝑎𝑥 ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
). Results in column (1) are based on countries having an above median rank in the Financial Secrecy 
Index (Tax Justice Network, 2015). Results in column (2) are based on countries having a below median rank in the Financial 
Secrecy Index (Tax Justice Network, 2015). Log_TotalAssets is the natural log of total assets. ROAA is the return on average 
assets (total average assets equals total assets at the beginning of the period, plus total assets at the end of the period, divided 
by two). Log_FTE is the natural log of the number of full-time-equivalent employees. ETR is the GAAP-effective tax rate. 
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Appendix A: List of tax havens 
 
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction Jurisdiction 
1. Andorra* 19. Gibraltar* 37. Nauru* 
2. Anguilla* 20. Grenada* 38. Netherlands Antilles* 
3. Antigua and Barbuda* 21. Guernsey* 39. Niue 
4. Aruba* 22. Ireland 40. Palau 
5. Bahamas* 23. Isle of Man* 41. Panama 
6. Bahrain* 24. Jersey* 42. Samoa 
7. Barbados* 25. Latvia 43. San Marino 
8. Belize* 26. Lebanon 44. Seychelles 
9. Bermuda* 27. Liberia 45. Saint Lucia 
10. Botswana 28. Liechtenstein* 46. Saint Lucia 
11. British Virgin Islands* 29. Luxembourg* 47. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
12. Brunei Darussalam 30. Macao* 48. US Virgin Islands* 
13. Cape Verde 31. Maldives 49. Singapore 
14. Cayman Islands* 32. Malta* 50. Switzerland 
15. Cook Islands* 33. Marshall Islands* 51. Uruguay 
16. Costa Rica 34. Mauritius 52. Vanuatu* 
17. Cyprus* 35. Monaco 53. Delaware (U.S.)* 
18. Dominica* 36. Montserrat* 
  
 
This appendix lists the tax havens per Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) plus Delaware (U.S.). * denotes jurisdictions considered 
‘dot’ tax havens as defined by Hines & Rice (1994) plus Delaware (U.S.). The ‘Big 7’ are Hong Kong, Ireland, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Panama, Singapore and Switzerland (Hines and Rice, 1994). EU tax havens are Cyprus, Gibraltar, Ireland, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Malta (EU members part of the list in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). 
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